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Abstract: This conceptual paper argues that preferences of employers for collective 
action cannot be reduced to rational actors making decisions based on market structures 
or institutional logics. Both markets and institutions are inherently ambiguous and 
employers therefore have to settle for plausible – rather than accurate – rational 
strategies among many alternatives through so-called sensemaking. Sensemaking refers 
to the process by which employers continuously make sense of their competitive 
environment by building causal stories of competitive advantages. The paper therefore 
tries to provide a better understanding of how preferences for collectivism are formed, 
sustained and potentially changed by identifying dominant and competing stories that 
either reinforce or challenge preferences for collectivism. Hereby, the paper fills a 
theoretical, empirical and methodological void in studies that allude to the ambiguous 
role of markets and institutions but do not study how actors deal with this ambiguity. 
The sensemaking concept is illustrated with an analysis of wage bargaining in Denmark 
during the recent recession when Danish labour cost competitiveness was in a 
deplorable state. However, unlike countries in similar situations e.g. Finland and 
Sweden, Danish employers retained coordinated industry-level bargaining system, 
which makes it an interesting paradox to study from the vantage point of sensemaking.    
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Introduction 
While collective bargaining at varying pace has eroded in many countries in the recent 
four decades, employers still act collectively. This conceptual paper argues that the 
preferences employers for collective action cannot be reduced to rational actors making 
decisions based on market structures or institutional logics. Both markets and 
institutions are inherently ambiguous (Parsons, 2007; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) and 
employers therefore have to settle for plausible – rather than accurate – rational 
strategies among many alternatives through so-called sensemaking (Weick, 1995; 
Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Sensemaking refers to the process by which employers 
continuously make sense of their competitive environment by building causal stories of 
competitive advantages (Porac et al., 1989).  
The paper therefore tries to provide a better understanding of how preferences for 
collectivism are formed, sustained and potentially changed by identifying dominant and 
competing stories that either reinforce or challenge preferences for collectivism. The 
sensemaking concept comes from organization studies and sociological institutionalism 
and provides a novel theoretical micro-foundation for the study of employer 
collectivism that couches the empirical investigation at the company level. Hereby, the 
paper fills a theoretical and methodological void in studies that allude to the ambiguous 
role of markets and institutions but do not study how actors deal with this ambiguity. 
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The sensemaking concept is illustrated with an analysis of wage bargaining in Denmark 
during the recent recession. In Denmark, multi-employer collective agreements for 
many decades have served to on one hand take wages out of competition and on the 
other moderate wages. The Danish wage bargaining systems therefore constitutes a 
clear example of employer collective action (Madsen et al., 2016). During the recent 
recession, however, Danish labour cost competitiveness was in a deplorable state, 
raising doubts about the wage moderation function. However, in contrast to similar 
countries in similar situations like Finland and Sweden, where governments and social 
partners questioned their systems and reformed them to restore moderation of wages, 
Danish employers stuck to their coordinated industry-level bargaining system. This 
stability – despite loss of cost competitiveness and major job losses – makes Denmark 
an interesting case to study from the vantage point of sensemaking.    
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, employer 
collectivism is generally defined and the dominant explanations for employer 
collectivism are presented. It is argued that these explanations can be divided into two; 
market-based and institutionalist explanations. In the second section of the paper, the 
concept of sensemaking is developed by addressing the question of how employers 
subscribe to stories about competitive advantage stemming from employer collectivism. 
In the third section, I illustrate how the sensemaking concept can be used in the cases of  
how employers in Denmark have made sense of their employer associations during 
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economic recession. The fourth section concludes with a reflection of how the 
sensemaking concept brings analytical value to the study of employer collectivism.  
     
Explaining employer collectivism 
Conventional accounts of employer collectivism depart from the assumption that 
employers will cooperate when it is in their economic interest to do so. The self-interest 
in cooperation between potential competitors originates for three general reasons 
(Schmitter and Streeck, 1999: 12; Windmuller and Gladstone, 1984). Firstly, employers 
cooperate to control forces in markets that are harmful to the incumbent companies like 
cut-throat price competition, access of new market players, control of input costs. 
Secondly, employers cooperate to countervail the power of organised labour to secure 
stable and affordable labour supply (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011). Thirdly, employers 
cooperate to countervail popular demand for legal regulation and taxation of companies 
especially in democracies (ibid.). Collectivism between employers is, however,  subject 
to free-rider problems when employers enjoy public goods without contributing to the 
production thereof (Olson, 1965). Therefore, while these three interests are general, we 
need more fine-grained explanations to account for particular instances of employer 
collective action.  
In my account of different explanations for employer collectivism, I depart from 
Parsons’ distinction between market-structural, institutional and ideational 
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explanations
1
 (2007). The two former are based on rationalist theory of human agency, 
but attribute causal powers to either market-structures or man-made institutions, 
respectively. The third explanation is based on how actors make sense of their 
environment and attributes causal power to man-made meaning structures. My account 
thus distinguishes institutions – that constrain and enable rational actors by providing 
them incentive structures – from meaning structures – that equip actors with enabling 
and constraining interpretations of the world
2
. The distinction is vital because it yields 
two different types of analysis: 1) analysis of institutions’ mediating effect on the 
behaviour of rational agents, and 2) analysis the sensemaking behind behaviour of 
agents that may or may not be ‘rational’ in a material sense. As I will show, the second 
type of analysis relies on demonstrating that neither market structure, nor institutions 
predetermined sensemaking, i.e. that meaning structures behind an action cannot be 
reduced to rational acts based on market structures or institutional incentive structures 
(Parsons, 2007: 13). This is a tall order, but also one that corresponds well with recent 
work on institutional change and ambiguity (e.g. Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Borrás and 
Seabrooke, 2015).       
                                                          
1
 I leave out psychological explanations which are also included in Parsons mapping: ‘Psychological 
claims assert that people perceive the world around them through hard-wired instincts, affective 
commitments, and/or cognitive shortcuts’ (Parsons, 2007: 13). 
2
 Many scholars in the sociological institutionalist camp would argue that they also study institutions. To 
be clear, distinguishing institutional from ideational explanations is about identifying more precisely the 
causal forces in different theories. Following Parsons, it can be said that the ‘… Ideational explanation 
addresses the subset of institutions (practices, symbols, norms, grammars, models, identities) through 
which people interpret their world. (2007: 100)’. Indeed, early institutionalist Veblen argues that 
institutions were the prevalent habits of thought (1899).     
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In market-structural explanations employers’ interest in cooperating depend on their 
positions in market structures, that is, the resource allocation and relationships between 
companies (Parsons, 2007). Scholars will, however, emphasise different structures. 
Windmuller and Gladstone (1984) and Schmitter and Streeck (1999) for example posit 
that company size matters. One market leader might not need collectivism while a few 
larger companies cannot go-it-alone. The few larger companies might therefore take on 
the cost of cooperation and sanction that smaller actors do not free-ride. Heterogeneity 
of company size might actually help the production and sustainment of employer 
collectivism. Some scholars, conversely, argue that collectivism can be hampered by 
employer heterogeneity. For example, if companies have different mixes of capital, 
labour and raw materials, this might give them different preferences for collectivism on 
labour matters. For example, Swenson (2002) argues that employers under fierce low-
cost competition and employing low-skilled workers benefit from collective bargaining 
as it takes wages out of competition. Conversely, employers in high-end manufacturing 
and exposed to international competition, have an interest in flexible wage-setting to 
attract high-skilled labour but must avoid cost-push externalities from other industries 
due to foreign competition. Finally, employers that are not in competition with foreign 
companies and employ highly skilled workers can easily pass on pay hikes to price 
increases for consumers and therefore might prefer company level bargaining.  
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Internationalisation of markets might erode the preference for national employer 
association as employers no longer direct their business towards national markets (Katz, 
1993). In this vein, Kitschelt et al. (1999) argue that national employer collectivism in 
labour markets will eventually wither away as they national collectivism no longer fits 
the markets, in which companies operate.  
Institutionalist explanations, conversely, stress that man-made rules, norms and 
procedures mediate market structures by providing specific logics for behaviour (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996; Parsons, 2007). This explanation suggests that institutions either 
promote or demote collectivism by providing incentives for collectivism. And as 
institutions give positive feedback to existing logic of actions they produce path 
dependency despite changes to market structures, e.g. internationalization (Pierson, 
2004; Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1991).  
Scholars, however, disagree about which institutions are decisive. For example, Korpi 
(2006) argues that employers develop a preference for cooperation when forced to by 
strong trade unions that have control over labour supply. This logic is central to 
industrial relations scholars (Windmuller and Gladstone, 1984; Sisson, 1987; Sheldon et 
al., 2014). Institutions that promote strong unions, such as the Ghent-system and lax 
regulation of industrial action, are therefore conducive to employer collectivism 
(Traxler, 2007). Conversely, the varieties of capitalism-literature (Hall and Soskice, 
2001) argues that employers in certain countries have a first-best preference for 
8 
 
cooperation due to the competitive advantage they derive from institutionalized public 
goods, such as training funds and wage moderation in collective bargaining. Moreover, 
employment protection legislation might help employers in overcoming market failures 
in skill formation (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001) as it secures a return on investment on skills 
when poaching becomes harder. 
Martin and Swank (2012) argue that employers build macro-level coordination 
capability due to the parliamentary system of a nation and the state structure. In multi-
party systems, business never found a strong Conservative party to represent their 
interest and employers therefore had to build political clout through associations to 
counter-balance labour and agriculture. Conversely, in two-party systems, strong 
conservative parties represented business vis-à-vis labour and agriculture and the need 
for strong business associations did not materialise. Moreover, in unitary states 
employer associations had an integrated macro-political arena on which to coordinate 
interests, as opposed to federalist systems where the political locus is dispersed between 
federal and state level.  
The above sketched theories are based on rational employers cooperating according to 
market positions or institutional incentives. Wailes et al. (2003) have argued for an 
integration of institutional and interest-based theories, which retains institutional 
insights but examines the role interests play in shaping the relationship between 
international economic change and national/institutional patterns of industrial relations. 
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Mapping both institutions and interests for explanatory purposes is important. However, 
I argue that market-structures and institutions are ambiguous and because of ambiguity, 
preferences are not self-evident for employers (cf. Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1991; Borrás and 
Seabrooke, 2015). Ambiguity stems from two sources. First, there is an issue of 
intersectionality. Actors pertain to various institutional domains, giving actors some 
freedom to choose between different institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Weber and Glynn, 2006). The institutional domains pertaining to membership of an 
employer association can range widely from wage bargaining, competition policy, 
environmental lobbyism, vocational education and training (VET) provisions, to fiscal 
policy etc. The logic of action in each domain may or may not coincide depending on 
the specific situation. For example, the institutional domain of wage bargaining and 
VET might coincide when VET-provision is collective but wage bargaining takes place 
at company level. Employers fearing poaching through local wage premium on skills 
might start to question the viability of collective VET-provision. However, this coupling 
of institutional domains by an employer is not automatic but requires active 
identification of the problem of poaching due to company-level wage bargaining (as 
opposed to poaching in general) and suggestions of solutions that may or may not be of 
a collective nature. This is where sensemaking comes in. 
Market structures – and therefore material interests – are also characterised by 
intersectionality. Consider the long list of variables expected to affect the associative 
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potential of a population of employers in Schmitter and Streeck (1999: 24-30): Number 
of employers; equality of resources; degree of competition; degree of interdependence; 
heterogeneity of factor inputs/outputs; company turnover; profitability/growth; and 
social interactions/cohesion. These variables can be measured but for owners they need 
to be factored against each other, because collectivism might be rational in one 
structure, but irrational in another. Much of this – I argue – will depend on what 
institutional  and structural elements are deemed as most important to the company. In 
turn, these choices will have consequences for the decisions of 1) becoming a member 
of the association and 2) what the membership is supposed to deliver.               
Second, there is an issue of change. The choice to be a member of an association might 
be stable over time but it is not permanent, nor is the content of the membership, i.e. 
what associations do for their members. In the market-based explanation, change occurs 
due to market structures changing. Responses to structural changes are, however, not 
self-evident (Blyth, 2003) and very similar structural changes have been dealt with 
remarkably differently by similar actors – there is a gap between structural change and 
actors’ responses. The institutionalist explanation goes a long way in filling this gap by 
referring to specific institutions that shape how employers filter and respond to 
structural changes. However, institutions themselves change and rules are often 
ambiguous (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), not least due to intersectionality. 
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Some scholars have introduced discourses or ideas as meaning structures to explain 
both stability and shifts in employer preferences (cf. Schmidt, 2010). For example, 
Frege shows how national discourse of democracy at work produce different institutions 
for industrial democracy (2005). However, this approach often operates at the macro-
level, e.g. the transition from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism (Campbell & Pedersen, 
2001) and is therefore insensitive to how actors actively use ideas differentially. The 
issues of intersectionality and change call for a more agency-based view of how markets 
and institutions are framed by meaning structures, i.e. how actors make sense of 
markets and institutions (Carstensen, 2010). To be sure, this call does not negate that 
market structures, institutions or macro-ideas are important in explaining employer 
collectivism – they clearly are. But these explanations cannot tell us much about how 
actors continuously and strategically solve ambiguity by making sense of markets and 
institutions. To this end, macro-ideas can serve a normative and/or cognitive repertoire 
of making sense of reality, but these ideas do not determine the sensemaking process 
and are often too ‘distant’ to influence meso- and micro level preference formation.    
 
Introducing sensemaking 
Employers and their managers continuously rationalize their actions in relation to their 
competitors and other stakeholders (Porac et al,. 1989). The framework for sensemaking 
analysis of employer collectivism focuses on 1) the salient cues about competitive 
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advantage in relation to employer collectivism, and 2) how these cues labelled, 
categorized and related to each other into dominant and/or competing stories (Weick et 
al., 2005). Cues are understood as signals from the environment, e.g. from competitors, 
customers or suppliers about how the company is doing. A story is primarily cognitive 
as it develops a causal explanation of why an outcome occurs. To this end, macro-ideas 
are instrumental references as they typically involve models of cause-effect 
relationships (March, 2010). Also, managerial ‘frames of reference’ based on unitarist 
or pluralists attitudes might be used by employers (cf. Foster et al. 2011). As such, 
employers engage in activities similar to social scientists that work within certain causal 
universes that link certain conditions with certain outcomes and sometimes revise both 
the conditions and the outcomes of interest.   
For our purposes, the story is about how employer collectivism causes competitive 
advantage – or not – for the company (March, 2010). An example of the former could 
be: ‘we share the cost of training collectively because it funds training we otherwise 
would not get’. An example of the latter could be: ‘we are paying too much to training 
funds compared to other members of the employer association’. These two stories are 
equally possible in one particular market structure and institutional setting and 
competing stories could indeed be likely due to intersectionality, which underlines the 
salience of sensemaking for studies of employer collectivism.  
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If employers interpret new cues from their environment using the dominant story, the 
preference for collectivism is reinforced. This process is what Borrás and Seabrooke 
(2015:10) call ‘belonging’ – that is retrospective replication-based sensemaking, which 
refers to creation of narratives that ‘… explain what happened in terms of cues and 
causal stories from embedded identities and social norms’. If, however, the collectivist 
story is challenged by the competing story (Näslund and Pemer, 2012) employer 
collectivism might be jeopardized. Competing stories can emerge when cues are 
labelled or categorized differently from the dominant story. While external shocks are 
conducive to competing stories, the process can also occur by what Borrás and 
Seabrooke (2015: 11) call ‘search systems’ – that is prospective, abstraction-based 
sensemaking, which refers to systems in organizations that create ‘… an analytical 
framework that identifies and organizes important information in a future-oriented 
manner to help address organizational and institutional uncertainties’. By this manner, 
companies might constantly be questioning employer collectivism in an organised 
system.  
While Weick’s concept of sensemaking is useful and addresses the interactive process 
of sensemaking between actors, it underplays the political dynamics of sensemaking 
due to its intra-organisational focus. As Tolliday and Zeitlin (1991: 21) argue, employer 
collectivism is never a simple aggregation of objective interest – collectivism must be 
politically constructed. The work of Fligstein (2001) and his work with McAdam 
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(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) complements well in this regard because it combines 
sensemaking with the emergence, reproduction and transformation of local social orders 
such as the institutionalised cooperation between employers in labour markets. For 
Fligstein and McAdam, the issue of local social orders – or strategic action fields as 
they call them (ibid.: 9) – consist of actors who interact on the basis of more or less 
shared understandings of: 1) the purpose of the field, that is, what is at stake in the 
interaction, 2) who the powerful actors in the field are; 3) what the rules of the game in 
the field are; and 4) what the other actors in the field are doing (ibid.: 11). These 
understandings are not consensual, but ambiguous and depend on the position of the 
actor in the field. Incumbent actors dominate the field and are usually resourceful actors 
that benefit from the rules of the field, while challengers possess less resources and are 
at a disadvantage from the rules. Moreover, incumbents and challengers will typically 
differ in how they view the legitimacy of these understandings – incumbents believing 
that the shared understandings are legitimate and just, while the challengers believe 
them to be stigmatizing and unjust. Nevertheless, challengers gain from the being part 
of the field, at least in the sense that being outside of it is not an option.  
In contrast to formal institutionalism that focus on power-relations through the lens of 
rule-markers and rule-takers (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), Fligstein and McAdam argue 
that incumbents and challengers are constantly engaged in a battle over sensemaking in 
their field. This does not mean fluid power-relations, as the incumbents hold 
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advantageous positions to control sensemaking in the field, but it does mean that there is 
‘substantial latitude for routine jockeying and piecemeal change in the positions that 
actors occupy’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 12). By relabelling and re-categorizing 
cues from the environment, one actor can suddenly be promoted or relegated in the 
field, e.g. when the work organisation of one challenger company is heralded as a 
source of competitive advantage vis-à-vis the incumbent or a bargaining level is viewed 
as outdated by some employers. Alternatively, new coalitions between challengers can 
arise that threaten the position of incumbents. Incumbents can resist these strategies 
either through resource-dependence measures or by counter-coalition making, hereby 
reproducing the positions of the field. In this regard, sensemaking plays a great part in 
mobilising support for the incumbents’ understanding of what is at stake, who the 
powerful actors are, what the rules are, and what the other actors are doing. The last 
point is crucial in this regard. If incumbents can frame the actions of challengers as a 
danger to whole field, i.e. it will crumble if order is not restored, then it is likely that the 
incumbent can forge a powerful counter-coalition.          
Due to ambiguity, the strategic actions between actors and coalitions of actors cannot be 
reduced to self-interested actions based on objective material interests or institutional 
logics. Rather, as Fligstein (2001) suggests, strategic actions are often motivated by a 
need for cooperation in the face of ambiguity. Cooperation – to be sure – can serve 
some actors better than others (Ibsen, 2015), but it always involves interaction that is 
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framed by different degrees of authority, i.e. from direct authority to equal exchanges 
(Weber, 1978 cited in Fligstein, 2001). Fligstein (ibid.) suggests that some actors are 
better skilled than others to induce cooperation that is not based on direct authority. 
Skilled actors do so by providing a legitimate understanding of the situation, including 
what the problem and potential to this problem is. This skill can be based on agenda-
setting (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), bricolage (Campbell, 2004), identifying interests 
rather than bargaining positions, mediation and brokering (Fisher and Ury, 1981) or by 
fixing a focal point in bargaining between actors (ibid.). These are all strategies in 
which sensemaking occurs by narrowing complex, ambiguous situations down to 
specific problems and solutions that reflect a certain causal story.  
Sensemaking that involves collective action by employers is therefore a highly political 
process – a game – in which both social skills and material resources are activated. 
What is at stake is both the membership of employer associations and the content of this 
membership. As noted, membership rates might be very stable but the content of 
membership rarely is. In this game, employers will strategize and form coalitions in 
order to affect the course of employer associations. These processes are continuous and 
lead to incremental changes. In addition, external shocks such as international economic 
crisis cast existing causal stories about competitiveness in doubt giving substantial 
latitude for competing stories (Borrás and Seabrooke, 2015). The next section provide 
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examples of sensemaking by Danish employers during the most recent economic 
recession.  
 
Employer collectivism in Denmark during recession  
This section presents some illustrative quotes from employer representatives in 
Denmark and how they made sense of employer collectivism during the recent 
recession. We focus on the private sector, as the public sector employers are almost 100 
% covered by collective agreements and can solve collective action problems through 
legislation (Madsen et al., 2016). Danish companies typically join mixed associations, 
that is, where the employer and business functions are joined in one association. By 
design mixed associations make it possible that some companies are members for other 
reasons than the employer functions of the association. Indeed, Danish employer 
associations often allow for à la carte memberships in which the employer functions can 
be waived. The latest private sector estimates report a 52 % employer density measured 
by representation of employed persons working for member companies. However, this 
density rate conceals that unorganised companies often join the relevant collective 
agreement for their economic area. The collective bargaining coverage is thus 
approximately 74 % of private sector employees (DA, 2014). Around 70 percent of the 
wage-earners are members of trade unions (Ibsen et al., 2014). 
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Since the beginning of the 1990s, Danish employer associations have merged 
extensively to reduce the number of associations that were typically based on trades and 
small industries. Today, 14 associations belong to the Confederation of Danish 
Employers (DA) which covers more than 28,000 private companies and 653.000 full 
time (equivalent) employees in manufacturing, retail, transport, services and 
construction (see table below). The finance sector employers covering 65.000 full-time 
employees are organised in the Employers’ Association for the Financial Sector. The 
table below reports the main member associations of DA.   
 
Table 1 here 
 
The Danish collective bargaining system retains a high degree of coordination between 
employers on wage bargaining (Martin and Swank, 2012; Madsen et al. 2016). Multi-
employer agreements set minimum wage levels for the covered companies within an 
industry. The agreements can stipulate the actual paid wage or be merely minimum 
wages which local bargaining agreements need to stay above. Figureless agreements 
also exist for salaried workers. Private sector bargaining is highly coordinated 
horizontally through patter-bargaining, where the exporting industries set the ‘wage 
increase norm’ for the sheltered industries (Ibsen, 2015). DI (see table 1) represents the 
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exporting companies and is therefore the key employer association in the bargaining 
system. Moreover, it dwarfs the other associations due to its size.    
Coordination on wages between employers solve two collective action problems 
between employers. Firstly, for the majority of workers within the DA-labour market, 
the multi-employer agreements set the floor and thus take out wages from competition 
between employers. As there is no statutory minimum wage in Denmark, collective 
agreements are therefore crucial for the internal regulation of wage competition between 
employers and thus constitute a clear example of employer collective action (Schmitter 
and Streeck, 1999). Secondly, coordination through pattern bargaining produces wage 
moderation. In small open economies, coordination is crucial since pay hikes in the 
sheltered sectors can be a cost-burden on exporting companies and eventually on the 
whole open economy (Traxler, 2007). In Denmark, a multi-tiered wage bargaining 
system exists in which framework agreements on terms and conditions set a norm for 
wage developments, but actual wages are decided at company level. By horizontally 
coordinating wage developments around the economic performance of exporting 
companies, other industries (and their employees) should overall be better off (however 
see Ibsen, 2015).  
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Employers’ sensemaking during the recession 
Four general points can be made about the Danish economic recession of 2008-2014 
(Goul Andersen, 2014; Ibsen, 2011). First, Denmark was in a very favourable economic 
situation at the outset of the crisis with very low levels of unemployment which put 
wage moderation to the test. Second, the negative impacts of the recession have been 
relatively more severe on key socioeconomic indicators than in other Northern-
European countries. Danish unemployment rates increased sharply from 4,1 % in the 
last month of 2008 when recession hit Denmark to 7,2 the same time next year. Third, 
the bounce back of the Danish economy in terms of growth and unemployment has been 
somewhat slower than in other similar countries. Fourth and crucial for my purposes, 
failure to moderate wages were identified as a key cause of the poor performance of the 
Danish economy.    
In terms of the two collective action problems between employers, coordination still 
served to put a floor under wages, but it had failed in moderating wages. In the years 
2000-2008, unit labour costs in Denmark increased by 30 percentage points [year 
2000=100] (Økonomi og Indenrigsministeriet, 2013: 30), which was substantially more 
than in competitor countries, notably Germany and Sweden. A key function of 
employer coordination was thus called seriously into question and a very plausible 
analysis of Danish wage developments during this period could read as follows: In the 
Danish multi-tiered bargaining system with company level wage bargaining setting 
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actual wages, employers that face strong local unions are ill-equipped to control wage 
developments – especially in times of low unemployment as was the case in Denmark 
before the crisis hit. Such an analysis of the problem could have spurred calls by 
employers – or their representatives – to create collective systems that control wage 
developments better, e.g. through incomes policies, or let the markets rule by 
decentralizing wages to the company level (Calmfors and Driffil, 1988).  
These calls by employers were heard in similar countries with similar labour cost issues 
made sense differently than the Danish employers. As shown below, Finish employers 
had similar cost competitiveness problems, but clearly made sense of their situation in a 
very different way than their Danish colleagues. In Sweden, the employer confederation 
in 2010 argued that wage bargaining be decentralized from multi-employer agreements 
to company-level agreements. However, trade unions refused and a minor revision of 
the bargaining model kept the employers in multi-employer bargaining. Both small 
open economies like Denmark, Finland and Sweden were suffering from problems of 
labour cost competitiveness and huge job losses. Nonetheless, calls for bargaining 
centralization or decentralization to restore competitiveness never appeared in Denmark 
and real debates about the wage bargaining system among employers were largely 
absent despite the failure to moderate wages. Moreover, considering the powerful 
position of DI which represents companies in the export sector that suffered most from 
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rising unit labour costs, it is surprising that this organization did not call the system for 
wage bargaining coordination into question.  
Looking into the quotes of employer representatives might give an idea of the reasoning 
behind this absence. The following quotes are taken from 15 semi-structured interviews 
with employer representatives. The interviews revolved around issues of bargaining 
coordination and were conducted during 2010 and 2012. The quotes are chosen for their 
illustrative value and the purpose of the analysis is to show the potential of a 
sensemaking analysis – not give a full account of wage bargaining coordination during 
the recession.    
In the following quote, a respondent uses cues about agreements on wages from the 
environment – in this case Germany – and relates these cues with specific labour market 
and institutional factors.   
’There is no doubt that we take responsibility for the agreements that we 
make. And how does this responsibility relate to the fact that our costs are 
way too high – in manufacturing the unit labour cost is 30 DKK above the 
German? Well, it’s a consequence of decentralized [multi-tiered] wage 
bargaining  which is market-based and affected by alternative employment 
opportunities, taxation, labour supply shortages etc.’ 
The quote shows that cost competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany is highly salient, but the 
reasons for higher unit labour costs are market-based – labour supply shortage – with 
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the addition of (high) taxation on income – not the institution of wage bargaining 
system per se. In previous crises, most notably during the 1970s, employers – and 
metalworking unions – rallied around a shift from confederate bargaining to industry-
based bargaining with framework agreements on wages to curb wage inflation (Due et 
al. 1994). In contrast, the recent crisis – despite issues of cost competitiveness – did not 
spur calls for formal institutional changes of wage bargaining.  
An underlying reason for letting wage bargaining ‘off the hook’ comes in the next quote 
where a respondent makes sense of the institution – multi-tiered wage bargaining:  
‘I’m a great supporter of this system. Because it’s a system that shows 
where the weaknesses are. It’s a system that show us all, including our 
politicians and the trade unions, what the effects of doing something 
stupid are… … and it’s far better that someone does something stupid in 
Nakskov [small city on the island of Lolland] and the company has to 
close, than if the LO and DA do something stupid on behalf of Denmark 
making Denmark close’    
The employer representative believes that market-discipline under company-level wage 
bargaining is better than wage moderation under more centralized wage bargaining. 
Moreover, there is an express concern that centralized bargaining will get it wrong with 
macro-economic consequences while company level bargaining is an isolated matter. 
This is despite the fact that Denmark as a whole had lost cost competitiveness with its 
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system. Clearly, the loss of cost competitiveness during the 2000s shows that ‘mistakes’ 
on wage setting at the company level can have macro-level consequences – but this 
story is absent in the employer’s sensemaking.  
As counterfactual cases of what would have happened in the absence of this story, we 
find Finland which opted for incomes policies to moderate wages (Sippola, 2015). In 
Finland, the causal story was: ‘if we don’t strengthen the control over company level 
bargaining, we will lose competitiveness’. However, the story has not been without 
counter-stories. Social partners and the government have been in political turmoil since 
the dominant employer confederation wanted to do away with tripartite incomes 
policies in 2011. This led to chaotic company level bargaining and wage-drift. 
Employers subsequently joined the government and the unions to re-instate tripartite 
incomes policies to moderate wages (Andersen et al., 2014). In 2015, the employer 
confederation decided to withdraw from tripartite bargaining again, but then returned to 
tripartite bargaining with the union confederation in 2016. Without going into detail 
with the Finnish story, it shows the ambiguity of markets and institutions and how 
sensemaking of the situation in Finland affected the actions taken in a different way 
than in Denmark.   
Sensemaking in general involves highlighting differences between ‘our way of doing 
things’ and ‘others’ way of doing things’. In this quote, an employer representative 
explains the difference between institutionalized wage moderation in Norway and the 
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Danish wage bargaining system – equating the Norwegian way with how things were 
done in the past in Denmark.   
‘Taking Norway as an example of what we in Denmark had in the 
beginning of the 1980s – sending out common decrees about what you 
[companies] can and cannot do [regarding wages]… … as you can tell 
I’m a huge supporter of giving the labour market full responsibility of 
problems that might exist.  
In this way, the Danish wage bargaining system is placed ‘in front’ of the Norwegian in 
terms of institutional development. The Norwegian is archaic – a thing of the Danish 
past. An additional quote shows how the sensemaking of the past is an important tool 
for sensemaking of the present:  
‘During many years we were out of step [concerning wage developments], 
and we didn’t align until in 2000. We should not get out of step again – 
and we won’t. There has been so many [analysts] that have sat down and 
philosophised about what being out of step cost us in terms of wage 
increases… it ruined everything for us internally in the private sector, in 
relation to the finance sector and in relation to the public sector wage 
increases.’    
The specific Danish way of bargaining wages with pattern-setting coordination around 
the manufacturing agreement is thus placed in time and as a natural outcome of a 
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learning process; On one hand, the centralized system similar to Norway was too rigid 
for companies and took away responsibility from local players. On the other hand, 
uncoordinated bargaining as seen in the 1990s when bargaining rounds were not 
synchronized was also costly.   
The causal story underlying the Danish advantage of a coordinated two-tier bargaining 
system appears in the next quote:  
‘It’s a system that is capable of creating social capital, proximity and 
community in the companies because collective agreements are so open 
and local actors have to take responsibility’.  
So, not only does markets discipline local wage bargaining, decentralisation of wage 
bargaining to the company level also creates social capital, proximity between workers 
and management and a sense of community. This causal story is akin to academic work 
by Per Hull Kristensen and colleagues that stress how workers are engaged in 
continuous improvements of work organisation due to a sense of community with the 
company (Kristensen, 2015). The employer representative couples this sense of 
community, i.e. the open collective agreements not only provide flexibility but also 
local responsibility and community feeling. Notice, that this coupling is quite a different 
portrayal of decentralised bargaining than commonly found among union officials who 
stress growing wage differentials. Arguably, actors from different positions will give 
different meanings to decentralisation to the company level. 
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Sensemaking of wage bargaining thus cemented the existing institutions in Denmark. 
This is what Borrás and Seabrooke (2015:10) call ‘belonging’ by creating narratives 
that explain what happened in terms of cues and causal stories from embedded 
identities and social norms. The quotes from employer representatives stress the 
adequacy of past reforms, i.e. decentralization of collective bargaining to the company 
level, despite the loss of cost competitiveness in three ways: 1) loss of cost 
competitiveness is not due to the institutions but labour market shortages and taxation, 
2) centralization is a thing of the past, 3) decentralization to company level entails 
learning through market-discipline which is superior to learning at confederate level 
bargaining, and 4) decentralization creates local communities at the workplace and 
therefore has positive spin-off effects on company performance.  
As noted above, DI – representing 62,3 of DA’s payroll – claims a key role in making 
sense of coordination. Its role is interesting, because from a purely market structural 
point of view, DI’s members are the ones suffering most from the lack of wage 
moderation. So why didn’t DI promote changes? Spanning manufacturing and service 
companies, DI, however, cannot afford to be myopic in how it represents its members. 
Moreover, the organization is so big that it also has to make sure that other 
organisations don’t feel stepped on when collective action is needed. As Fligstein 
(2001) suggests, strategic actions are often motivated by a need for cooperation in the 
face of ambiguity and raw coercion will most often be a short-sighted solution even for 
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dominant actors like DI. In the next quote, DI acts to preserve the sense of community 
among other employer representatives and secure collective actions by being pragmatic:  
‘… I think that DI also listens. You can move them and I believe that they 
guard the community more than previously. Previously, they would go-it-
alone more than they do now and I think that they have learnt not to bully 
because they don’t win anything from it. Of course, we also have to be 
good when we speak to DI-people, present our arguments and the 
challenges. So, I think they can be moved.’ 
Securing alliances for the future is an integrated part of being the dominant player 
among the employer associations. The quote shows that dominance is backed up by 
legitimacy, i.e. that DI is an organization that will listen to arguments and specific 
concerns of other employer associations. Hereby, DI takes on a systemic responsibility 
of keeping the community together – not least because the community serves the 
interests of DI. Listening and deliberating with other employer associations, 
nonetheless, has limits. The negotiations over the equal pay committee in 2010 is a 
good example. The issue was delegated to DA and LO but the confederations came to a 
stalemate. First going through the ropes of listening and being pragmatic, DI then went 
alone with its direct bargaining partner, CO-industry (a bargaining cartel for 
manufacturing unions). The point is that DI had to listen and be pragmatic before going-
it-alone to preserve the legitimacy in the employer community.  
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The quotes together give the impression that the economic recession and the cost 
competitiveness problem in Denmark did not give rise to any serious discussions among 
employers about reforming wage bargaining institutions. Indeed, the causal story about 
local wage bargaining and competitiveness was not seriously challenged except on two 
occasions in 2010 and 2014 when employers in the meat processing industry challenged 
the status quo by demanding that DI do away with minimum wages in their area due to 
low wage competition from Germany. DI – representing the meat processing employers 
– again had to keep collective action together by being skillful negotiators. This was 
done on one hand by presenting unions with a cautious demand of doing away with 
minimum wages, and on the other hand respecting that the unions would never accept to 
leave meat processing workers behind. Hereby, the dominant organization had 
represented its member employers loyally but preserved collective action on wages and 
thus maintained status quo.  
  
Concluding remarks 
This paper argues that the preferences of employers for collective action cannot be 
reduced to rational actors making decisions based on market structures or institutional 
logics. Both markets and institutions are inherently ambiguous (Parsons, 2007; Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005) and employers therefore have to settle for plausible – rather than 
accurate – rational strategies among many alternatives through so-called sensemaking. 
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Sensemaking refers to the process by which employers continuously make sense of their 
competitive environment by building causal stories of competitive advantages (Porac et 
al., 1989; Borrás and Seabrooke, 2015). The paper therefore tries to provide a better 
understanding of how preferences for collectivism are formed, sustained and potentially 
changed by identifying dominant and competing stories that either reinforce or 
challenge preferences for collectivism. Analysing quotes from interviews with Danish 
employer representatives, the paper illustrates how a specific sensemaking prevented 
employers from pursuing changes of the wage bargaining system despite the system’s 
failure to produce wage moderation. Employer associations have a key role in 
coordination that moderates wages, but this role had clearly failed. Using causal stories 
that located the problem of cost competitiveness outside the system, however, 
coordination and the bargaining system was ‘off the hook’. The analysis also shows how 
the most powerful employer association, DI, skilfully sustained this story.      
The introduction of sensemaking can inform analysis of employer collectivism in three 
ways. First, it takes ambiguity of institutions and markets seriously and shows how 
actors solve ambiguity. Due to the recession, Danish employers – like employers 
elsewhere – woke up to a new reality that researchers and practitioners are still trying to 
grasp. How collective action improves or deteriorates competitive advantage in this new 
reality is still not clear, but dominant actors in Denmark, so far, have cemented the 
existing causal story about coordinated wage bargaining. Second, analysis of quotes 
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from employer representatives and how they made sense of employer collectivism vis-
à-vis the crisis gives us an indication of where employer collectivism is going. The 
quotes in this paper reveal a path dependent logic, that is, the collective bargaining 
system is believed to be able to solve the challenges stemming from the recession. The 
absence of a competing causal story to how the deteriorated Danish cost 
competitiveness should be solved holds the bargaining system together (for accounts 
where the causal story changed see Culpepper, 2008 and Foster et al. 2011). Third, 
sensemaking makes the analysis attuned to how strategic actions are often about 
persuading and listening in the face ambiguity. Dominant actors thrive not only from 
being powerful in terms of resources but also from being seen as legitimate. 
Methodologically, the sensemaking analysis requires something different from the 
researcher. First, it requires qualitative data in which employers are allowed to reflect 
on collectivism together with the interviewer. This is a tall – but not impossible – order 
(Brinkmann, 2007). Certainly, some respondents will happily self-reflect. Second, it 
requires comparative case study of employers in different contexts, that is across market 
structures and institutional settings. Third, the treatment of data can be comprised in 
narrative analysis of causal stories of competitiveness, that is how actors see employer 
collectivism being a cause – or impediment – of competitiveness.  
To be sure, these theoretical and methodological ways to inform analysis by no means 
negate the importance of institutions and market structures. Institutions and market 
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structures should be analytical elements in a sensemaking analysis. But just as social 
scientists engage in concept formation and definitions to make sense of social 
phenomenon, so do social actors. By grounding the sensemaking analysis in rigorous 
institutional and structural analysis we could get the best of all worlds (cf. Parsons, 
2007). The analytical challenge is how to disentangle how specific institutions and 
market structures and changes thereof leave actors with ambiguity. Evidently, 
ambiguity is most prevalent during some sort of crisis, but as many scholars have now 
argued, ambiguity is endemic. As an analytical tool sensemaking gives us an 
opportunity to understand how actors deal with this endemic feature of the social world 
and more specifically to understand why employers chose to be a member of a 
collective organisation and what being a member means to them.      
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